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What does 2016 hold in store for eﬀorts aimed at strengthening Europe’s Economic and Monetary
Union? Benedicta Marzinotto writes that when compared with previous monetary regimes, the
euro area remains unstable and in need of reform. She argues, however, that the lack of political
appetite for cooperative solutions implies a sovereign default is possible in Greece this year and
potentially elsewhere in the Eurozone.
The EU is unlikely to make much headway in 2016. Not only are emerging markets catalysing
everybody’s attention, but as some EU member states have started to recover, political appetite for
reform is fading away. The deepening of EMU will remain an empty shell. This raises the question of whether the
euro area is a monetary union or just a special type of ﬁxed exchange rate regime similar to the Gold Standard or
the Bretton Woods system.
Such a debate has in fact started some time ago. For most commentators the introduction of capital controls – albeit
contingent and limited to the two cases of Cyprus and Greece – contradicts the very principle of having a monetary
union. The same applies to the fact that the euro area lacks a common ﬁscal capacity, which is what would allow a
league of countries that have given up standard monetary tools to withstand large negative shocks.
And yet, juxtaposing EMU to a “modern gold-standard type, ﬁxed-exchange rate system” is missing the point. We
are left with something far more ﬂawed and precarious than the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods ever were.
Previous regimes were consistent from an institutional point of view in the sense that the risks of the time were fully
insured. The same is not true for EMU. The risks the euro area is exposed to are systemic, but they are not covered
by an eﬀective insurance mechanism, exception made for the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), which will
never be activated.
In the late nineteenth century, capital mobility under the Gold Standard was unconstrained just like in the euro area,
but capital ﬂows were based on commodity money. It follows that credibility was less important than under the
current ﬁat money system. As a result, capital ﬂows were most often stabilising rather than destabilising. Moreover,
cross-border ownership of assets was limited, switching oﬀ one potential channel of crisis contagion.
As a consequence, credit (or sudden stops) risks were moderate and mostly individual and so was the available
insurance, which consisted of national gold reserves compounded with ad hoc cooperation amongst the large
central banks of the world. Beyond credit risks, each member feared convertibility. To the extent that this was a
beggar-yourself policy more than anything else, collective insurance against the risk of abandoning the peg was
unnecessary. All in all, the regime was incentive-compatible as illustrated by the table below.
Table: Risks and insurance design across monetary regimes
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Note: For more information on the three monetary regimes see: Gold Standard, Bretton
Woods system, euro area.
Also Bretton Woods was internally consistent from an institutional point of view. Given capital controls, credit (or
sudden stops) risks were small. As exchange rates were ﬁxed but adjustable and members retained autonomy in
economic policy, convertibility risks were also small but not absent. The IMF was indeed created to prevent default
and beggar-your-neighbour devaluation. Such risks were tangible mostly falling on creditors, which happened to be
also export-led economies interested in preserving their world trade shares. In this respect, ﬁnancial assistance via
the IMF was a perfect type of insurance because countries paying into the system were insuring themselves against
default and devaluation from part of their partners, as shown in the table.
The euro zone does not beneﬁt from the same institutional consistency. It is characterised by high capital mobility
including cross-border ownership of assets. This poses enormous credit (or sudden stops) risks. These are insured
via Target 2. On the other hand, convertibility risks have not been fully eliminated and remain driven by multiple
equilibria as a country’s destiny depends on the perception that ﬁnancial markets have of their capacity to access
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credit. A collective insurance against such risks had not been foreseen at Maastricht and was initially provided
through various ﬁnancial purpose vehicles now merged under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). These are
limited in size, thus representing partial insurance. Only the OMT promised to provide full insurance against
convertibility risks; yet the programme seems to already be a dead letter.
EMU is not like any ﬁxed exchange rate regime. Institutional inconsistency makes the euro area more unstable than
any previous rule-based monetary regime. On the back of multiple equilibria, having a ﬂawed ﬁscal union is certainly
not enough and probably worse than no ﬁscal union at all. The lack of political appetite for cooperative solutions
implies that we are heading this year for sovereign default(s) where public ﬁnances are in distress and economic
growth remains weak. Looking ahead, a clear scheme for debt restructuring would at least eliminate uncertainty and
leave member governments ultimately responsible and accountable for public debt management, for better or
worse.
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Note: This article builds on a book chapter by the author in the forthcoming book, Political and Economic Dynamics
of the Eurozone Crisis (edited by James A. Caporaso and Martin Rhodes).  The article gives the views of the author,
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